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NONCONSENSUAL BLOOD
DRAWS AND DUAL LOYALTY:
WHEN BODILY INTEGRITY
CONFLICTS WITH THE PUBLIC
HEALTH
JACOB M. APPEL*
Alcohol-impaired driving is among of the leading preventable causes of
premature death in the United States and constitutes a grave public health concern.1
In 2009, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recorded
10,839 fatalities involving drivers with blood alcohol levels above 0.08 g/dL.2
NHTSA analysis placed the economic cost of drunk driving, as of 2000, at $114.4
billion annually, including $71.6 billion paid by innocent third parties;3 in other
words, by conservative estimates, alcohol-impaired driving costs society between
sixteen and thirty cents for every mile driven under the influence.4 In order to
combat alcohol-impaired driving, state and local governments have in recent years
embraced a wide range of measures to apprehend offenders and remove them from
the roads. These include sobriety checkpoints,5 stiffer penalties such as mandatory
jail time,6 breath alcohol ignition locks,7 and the use of portable breathalyzers and
Copyright © 2014 by Jacob M. Appel.
*Jacob M. Appel is a psychiatrist at the Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City. BA Brown
University 1995, MA Brown University 1996, MA Columbia University 1998, MPhil Columbia
University 2000, MFA New York University 2000, JD Harvard Law School 2003, MD Columbia
University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons 2009, MS Albany Medical College 2012.
1. See, e.g., Christina Lindgren, Editorial, Drop The Scare Tactics: To Reduce Impaired
Driving Fatalities, Treat Young People With Respect, BALT. SUN, Dec. 1, 2011, at 23A (reporting
that in 2009, more than 10,000 people died as a result of impaired driving).
2. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PUB. NO. DOT HS 811 385, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS: 2009 DATA 1 (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811385.PDF.
3. Impaired Driving in the United States, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/impaired_driving_pg2/US.htm (last visited Mar. 21,
2013).
4. Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?, 109 J. POL.
ECON., 1198, 1201 (2001).
5. See Randy W. Elder et al., Effectiveness of Sobriety Checkpoints for Reducing AlcoholInvolved Crashes, 3 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 266, 266 (2002) (noting that sobriety checkpoints
have become popular law enforcement tools to curb drunk driving).
6. See Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI Fine
and Jail Penalties: Long-term Follow-up in 32 States, 39 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
982, 982 (2007) (noting that eighteen states enacted statutes imposing mandatory jail sentences for
first time DUI offenders from 1976 to 2002).
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blood draws in the field to determine the blood alcohol content of drivers suspected
of intoxication.8 Yet since their introduction by Lieutenant Robert Borkenstein of
the Indiana State Police in the 1950s, breath-based assessments of intoxication have
been frequently challenged in court on the grounds of accuracy, leading law
enforcement to prefer direct blood sampling.9
When suspects voluntarily agree to blood draws, this approach is not legally
problematic.10 Increasingly, however, states are permitting law enforcement
officers to draw blood forcibly from suspects and to seek the assistance of health
care providers in the involuntary phlebotomy process.11 Nonconsensual blood
draws from competent individuals raise a series of challenging ethical questions
regarding both unwanted medical interventions and the role of health
professionals:12
Do such blood draws violate fundamental human and
Constitutional rights to bodily integrity? Are physicians and other health care
providers bound to participate in forced blood draws as part of their professional
duty to serve the public welfare? Or are these providers forbidden to participate as
part of their professional obligation to respect patient autonomy and to do no harm?
This article surveys current federal and state law on the subject and then explores
the ethical and legal issues that are likely to confront physicians at this nexus of
patient care and law enforcement.
I.

CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE

On August 14, 2004, Marc Martel, an emergency room physician at Hennepin
County Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was ordered by police to
7. See C. Willis et al., Alcohol Ignition Interlock Programmes for Reducing Drink Driving
Recidivism, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REV., Oct. 18, 2004, at 2 (noting that alcohol
ignition interlocks are used in combating drinking and driving).
8. See Joseph T. Hallinan, Test Questions: In Fight to Stop Drunk Driving, Police Draw
Blood, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2004, at A1 (noting that police routinely request breath tests of
drivers suspected of drinking and driving and in many states also conduct forcible blood draws on
suspects as well).
9. See, e.g., Jay Romano, Drunken Driving Statutes Criticized, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 11, 1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/11/nyregion/drunken-driving-statutescriticized.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting one challenge in the New Jersey Supreme Court
to the legality of law enforcement using breathalyzers to obtain convictions for DUI offenses as
well as discussing the potential for error in administering such tests).
10. See People v. Ward, 120 N.E.2d 211, 213 (1954) (noting that since the defendant
voluntarily submitted to the test it was unnecessary to address the question whether a suspect must
be given notice of his right to refuse to take a test to establish alcoholic content); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a person who consents to
a blood draws waives due process objections).
11. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (showing that laws in at least eight states allow police to draw
blood by force and noting a common trend of police taking suspects who fail sobriety test to a
medical facility to have their blood drawn).
12. Id. (noting that forcible blood draws on suspects raise questions on the amount of force
that law enforcement may take in obtaining samples as well as the ethical dilemmas that medical
professionals face in being forced to conduct blood draws on patients).
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collect blood from a homicide suspect, Erik Lamont Lindsey, in order to determine
his degree of intoxication.13 When Dr. Martel refused, expressing concerns about a
hospital policy that prohibited performing “intrusive procedures” on unwilling
patients, police had Hennepin County District Judge Diana Eagon phone the
emergency room and order Dr. Martel to draw Lindsey’s blood.14 Minnesota state
law permits such involuntary blood draws with a warrant, but does not address the
question of whether health professionals can be commandeered for the phlebotomy
process.15 Dr. Martel continued to refuse and was arrested for obstructing a
homicide investigation.16 However, local prosecutors eventually declined to pursue
charges against the physician.17 In another case, an emergency room resident
physician at Martin Luther King Jr.-Drew Medical Center in Los Angeles, William
Watkins, was handcuffed and detained in 1988 for refusing to draw blood from an
unwilling hit-and-run suspect.18 A Compton police officer reportedly told the
physician, “You draw the blood or go to jail,” although the hospital had earlier
received clarification from the Deputy County Counsel stating that “if an arrestee
expressly refuses to submit to testing, hospital personnel may not force the arrestee
to submit to the testing.”19 In 2009, charge nurse Lisa Hofstra of Advocate Illinois
Masonic Center sued the city of Chicago after a police officer handcuffed her for
refusing to draw blood from a DWI suspect who had not yet been admitted to the
hospital.20 While the arrest of medical providers for refusing nonconsensual blood
draws remains a rare event, conflicts between clinicians and law enforcement will
continue to arise in circumstances where either providers are uncertain of their legal
duties or where their legal duties conflict with perceived ethical obligations to their
patients.21

13. See Associated Press, Doctor Not Charged in Refusal to Draw Blood, Saint Paul Pioneer
Press, Aug. 18, 2004, at B9 (describing the event that led to the arrest of Dr. Marc Martel).
14. Id.
15. See Minnesota v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50 (Minn. 2008) (holding that Minnesota
police officers may conduct a warrantless, forcible blood draw on a suspect arrested for drinking
and driving as long as officers have probable cause to believe that a suspect committed criminal
vehicular homicide or operation, but omitting whether medical professionals can be compelled to
conduct such blood draws).
16. Associated Press, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Claire Spiegel & Patt Morrison, Doctor Held As He Balks at Taking Blood Of Suspect,
L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 3.
19. Id.
20. Frank Main, Nurse Arrested on the Job Sues Police, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at 2.
21. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (noting that some doctors believe that performing blood draws
on suspects without patient consent violates the Hippocratic Oath while other doctors feel
reporting alcohol levels may violate the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
which prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of patients’ records).
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A. Blood Draws Under Federal Law and the U. S. Constitution
Federal law grants state and local jurisdictions significant latitude in
developing policies on nonconsensual blood draws.22 In the modern era, the United
States Supreme Court has generally adopted a restrictive view of forensic
techniques that involve nonconsensual invasions of a criminal suspect’s body.23 A
series of cases dating to the 1950s have addressed a wide assortment of law
enforcement efforts to extract evidence from the body of an unwilling suspect.24 In
the 1960s, most notably in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court attempted
to articulate a clear doctrine in this area that established a balancing act between the
nature of the incursion and the value of the evidence.25 During the ensuing five
decades, a patchwork of decisions emanating from both the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts has tended to favor strict limits upon such incursions, with
involuntary blood draws being an exception to the general trend.26
The seminal case in the field of involuntary invasions of bodily integrity is
Rochin v. California.27 On July 1, 1949, responding to a tip that a man named
Antonio Rochin was dealing in narcotics, the Los Angeles police entered Rochin’s
home without a warrant, where they found the suspect seated upon his bed.28 On a
night stand alongside the bed, “the deputies spied two capsules;” Rochin “seized
the capsules and put them in his mouth.”29 During the ensuing struggle, three

22. See Michael A. Correll, Is There a Doctor in the (Station) House?: Reassessing the
Constitutionality of Compelled DWI Blood Draws Forty-Five Years After Schmerber, 113 W. VA.
L. REV., 381, 400–01 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court’s “pro-search jurisprudence” on
forcible blood draws has resulted in many states adopting a variety of statutory responses to limit
their use by law enforcement).
23. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (finding in that case that a
forcible blood draw performed on a DWI suspect was reasonable because it was performed by a
physician under accepted medical standards).
24. See Michael G. Rogers, Bodily Intrusion in Search of Evidence: A Study in Fourth
Amendment Decision-making, 62 IND. L.J. 1181, 1183–84 (1987) (discussing Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), a case in which the Supreme Court overturned the defendant’s
conviction on the ground that officers illegally obtained evidence by extracting contents from the
defendant’s stomach); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Schmerber, 384 U.S.
757 (analyzing the constitutionality of blood draw under the fourth amendment of a conscious
suspect).
25. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71 (establishing that an officer could reasonably believe
that obtaining a warrant in order to draw a suspect’s blood could result in a delay that would
destroy necessary evidence).
26. See Edward D. Tolley & N.E.H. Hull, Court Ordered Surgery to Retrieve Evidence in
Georgia in Light of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Winston v. Lee, 37 MERCER L.
REV. 1005, 1006, 1008–09 (1986) (discussing how many courts have held that any state ordered
surgical procedure on a suspect is a per se intrusion, but that most courts tend to uphold simple,
Schmerber-like procedures, such as taking blood samples from suspects).
27. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
28. Id. at 166.
29. Id.
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officers jumped upon the suspect in an effort to extract the capsules.30 When that
effort failed, Rochin was handcuffed and transported to a local hospital.31
According to Justice Frankfurter’s subsequent description of the facts: “At the
direction of one of the officers, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube
into Rochin’s stomach against his will. This ‘stomach pumping’ produced
vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two capsules which proved to contain
morphine.”32 As a result of this forced extraction, Rochin was convicted of a
California state statute prohibiting the possession of morphine without a
prescription.33 He challenged his conviction on the grounds that the extraction of
evidence constituted an unreasonable search and/or seizure that violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through its application of the Fourth
Amendment to the states,34 leading to one of the strongest verdicts in favor of
bodily integrity in the Court’s history to that time.35
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that forced stomach pumping to
retrieve illegal drugs violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.36 Writing for the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted that such
conduct “shocked the conscience.”37 He quoted two dissenting judges from the
California Supreme Court for the proposition that “a conviction which rests upon
evidence of incriminating objects obtained from the body of the accused by
physical abuse is as invalid as a conviction which rests upon a verbal confession
extracted from him by such abuse.”38 In principle, Rochin seemed to open the door
to a constitutional ban on the forcible extraction of blood.39
In the wake of the Rochin ruling, it was only a matter of time before a
criminal defendant challenged a forcible blood draw on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. The Court managed to sidestep the larger issue of involuntary extractions
in the 1957 case of Breithaupt v. Abram, ruling six to three in that blood drawn
from an unconscious suspect after a traffic fatality was admissible as evidence.40

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (discussing the decision of a California Superior Court to convict Rochin of violating
California law and sentence Rochin to sixty days in jail).
34. Brief for the Petitioner, Rochin, 342 U.S 165 (No. 83).
35. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 1184 (discussing Rochin as both a Fifth Amendment
decision prohibiting the police from extracting evidence from a suspect’s body, as well as a Fourth
Amendment decision denouncing certain police behavior).
36. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
37. Id. at 172 (elaborating that the manner in which police officers obtained the evidence does
“more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating
crime too energetically.”).
38. Id. at 167.
39. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 1184 (“Rochin draws a clear analogy between forcible
extraction of evidence from the body and coerced confession.”).
40. 352 U.S. 432, 433–35, 440 (1957)
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However, the Court left the determination of the constitutionality of forcible
extractions from conscious defendants to a future case.41 Yet Breithaupt did lay the
groundwork for extending the law enforcement prerogative to conscious but
unwilling suspects.42 Justice Tom Clark, writing for the majority, noted the
widespread use of blood testing in other areas of the law—from paternity testing to
the use of ABO blood-typing in narrowing down suspect pools in criminal cases (in
a manner that foreshadowed the later use of DNA evidence).43 Of note, Justices
Warren, Black and Douglas dissented. 44
The court finally confronted the issue of forcible blood draws from conscious
suspects directly in Schmerber v. California (1966).45 Writing for the Court,
Justice William Brennan noted that the seizure of elements of the human body was
a subject that the federal courts had rarely dealt with in the past, and that therefore
he was able to write upon “a clean slate.” 46 What resulted was an opinion that
implicitly created a balancing test for such forcible incursions.47 Brennan noted
that courts had previously upheld a wide swath of marginally intrusive
interventions.48 According to these earlier rulings, the Constitution offers no
protection against “compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, . . . to assume a stance, to walk,
or to make a particular gesture.”49 He also emphasized the significant value of
blood draws to law enforcement authorities, observing that the “[e]xtraction of
blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the degree to
which a person is under the influence of alcohol.”50 Finally, Brennan relied upon
the widespread use of the practice at the time: “Such tests are a commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examination, and experience with them teaches that
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that, for most people, the procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”51 One authority on the case, Illinois
attorney Jay Gitles, has observed that, “In Schmerber, the Court balanced the
41. See id. at 435 (noting that the case dealt with a blood draw of an unconscious driver).
42. Id. at 438 (noting that a blood draw under different conditions or on individuals deemed
incompetent may be objectionable).
43. Id. at 436, 438 n.4.
44. Id. at 440 (stating that the facts in Rochin were comparable to Breithaupt and therefore the
Court should find the same result).
45. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966) (deciding whether the
petitioner was denied due process when the arresting officer directed a physician to obtain a blood
sample despite the petitioner’s refusal).
46. Id. at 767–68.
47. See Jay A. Gitles, Fourth Amendment – Reasonableness Of Surgical Intrusions, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 972, 972 (1985) (noting that the Schmerber Court adopted a balancing
test that weighs a defendant’s right of personal privacy and bodily integrity against the state’s
interest in collecting evidence in determining the reasonableness of police conduct).
48. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763–64.
49. Id. at 764.
50. Id. at 771.
51. Id.
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procedure’s threat to the suspect’s safety and health and the intrusiveness upon the
suspect’s dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity against the
community’s evidentiary interest in more fairly and accurately determining guilt or
innocence.”52
Brennan’s ruling only applied to blood draws by medical personnel.53 He
declined to address the question of whether such blood draws would pass
constitutional muster if the police themselves drew blood at the stationhouse, nor
did he confront the question of whether medical professionals could be required to
extract blood.54 Yet as a result of Schmerber v. California, the practice of
warrantless blood draws after DWI stops became policy in many jurisdictions.55
Several decisions in the post-Schmerber era do suggest a window for
narrowing the powers on law enforcement in the future. Notably, in Winston v.
Lee, Virginia prosecutors sought court-ordered surgery to remove a bullet from the
chest of a robbery suspect, Rudolf Lee, who had allegedly been wounded at the
crime scene.56 The state hoped to use ballistic evidence to connect the defendant
directly to the victim’s gun.57 After a federal district court enjoined a state court
judge’s order for the surgery, the Supreme Court intervened.58 Justice Brennan
wrote for the Court once again and flushed out the balancing test he had hinted at in
Schmerber.59 According to Brennan, “the reasonableness of surgical intrusions
beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual’s
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in
conducting the procedure.”60 Ultimately, the Court decided that the surgery sought
by Virginia prosecutors did not pass the balancing test.61 Brennan observed that
“the intrusion on respondent’s privacy interests and bodily integrity can only be
characterized as severe. Surgery without the patient’s consent, performed under a
general anesthetic to search for evidence of a crime, involves a virtually total
52. See Gitles, supra note 47, at 979.
53. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771–72 (limiting the Court’s ruling to the validity of blood
draws conducted by medical professionals and noting that blood draws performed by non-medical
professionals or in non-medical environments present different concerns on suspects’ rights).
54. Id. at 772.
55. See Carleton v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1182, 1185 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
a warrant is not needed for a blood draw following a felony drunk driving arrest); see also Ellis v.
Cotton, 2008 WL 4182359, at *6–9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2008) (finding the case to be “remarkably
similar to Schmerber,” and finding that the police officer’s forcible extraction of blood did not
violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights).
56. 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985).
57. Id. at 755.
58. Id. at 757–58. Following the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s decision
to enjoin the surgery, the Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the state could force a suspect to undergo surgery in their efforts to gather
evidence for a crime. Id.
59. Id. at 763; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760.
61. Id. at 766.
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divestment of the patient’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his
skin.”62 He also took note of the “uncertainty about the medical risks” involving in
such a procedure, which he saw as a factor distinguishing it from the earlier blood
draw cases.63 In the decades since Winston, lower courts have been divided in their
verdicts when applying the balancing test to forced surgeries.64
In Schmerber, Brennan held out the possibility that the Constitution might
require an exception for those suspects who objected to blood draws out of
“concern for health, or religious scruple.”65 In theory, particularly after the limits
outlined in Winston, an individual defendant might be able to establish that the
unique aspects of his circumstances render an involuntary blood draw upon his
person more like the intrusion in Winston than that in Schmerber.66 To date,
however, no defendant has successfully done so. As a result, the most significant
impact of the Schmerber decision was to establish a legal floor that enabled state
and local authorities to generate their own guidelines for forcible blood draws.67
Needless to say, the results vary strikingly by jurisdiction, often shaped by state
constitutional requirement that may prove more stringent than those mandated by
the federal courts.68
In 2013, the Supreme Court revisited the issue warrantless blood draws in
Missouri v. McNeely.69 The case arose after Missouri police stopped driver Tyler
G. McNeely for allegedly speeding and crossing the yellow line.70 McNeely
refused both a breath analysis and a blood test to measure his blood alcohol content

62. Id. at 754.
63. Id. at 764 (noting the uncertainty in the nature of the surgery in that one surgeon believed
that it would take approximately fifteen to twenty minutes while another surgeon predicted that it
could last up to two and half hours).
64. See Gitles, supra note 47, at 979–80 (noting that, unlike the Winston Court, several lower
courts have permitted court-ordered surgery to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions).
65. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9, 771 (1966).
66. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 766 (finding in that case that the substantial intrusion of a
protected interest, the medical risks involved, and the intrusion on the suspect’s privacy that
would be caused by surgery, did not outweigh the state’s interest in gathering evidence).
67. See Correll, supra note 22, at 395, 401 (noting that states have generally responded to
Schmerber in one of four ways: allowing law enforcement to conduct forcible non-consensual
blood draws, adopting a right to refuse policy for drivers, permitting blood draws in severe
circumstances, or allowing police to notify suspects that force will be used unless they voluntarily
submit a blood sample).
68. See Willard Bergman, Jr., Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol: A Model Implied
Consent Statute, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV 654, 656 (1971) (noting that states used their police
powers to pass varying implied consent statutes authorizing chemical test to determine alcoholic
content over a concern of a growing drunk driving problem); see also Correll, supra note 22, at
401–02 (noting that states addressed differently the Schmerber use of force test by statute for
example Florida permits blood draws by a specified group of medical professionals, while
Maryland permits blood draws by a “qualified medical person” without enumerating specific
professions).
69. 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).
70. Id.
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(BAC).71 Relying on the “exigent circumstances” justification of Schmerber,72 the
police transported McNeely to a local hospital and had a lab technician draw his
blood without his consent.73 Both the trial court and the Missouri State Supreme
Court ruled the result of the test inadmissible as violations of the Fourth
Amendment, arguing that routine DWI stops did not qualify as emergencies, and
the state appealed.74 A fragmented United States Supreme Court, per Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, upheld the Missouri Supreme Court’s conclusion.75
Sotomayor did not reject Schmerber.76 Rather, she analyzed the facts of
McNeely in the context of Schmerber, ultimately rejecting the State of Missouri’s
claim that such blood draws in DWI cases were per se admissible evidence
because, as the state viewed the matter, the dissipation of alcohol from the blood
stream inherently posed an “exigent circumstance.”77 Instead, Justice Sotomayor’s
majority opinion, evaluating the need for warrantless action under a “totality of
circumstances” standard,78 found that routine DWI stops did not qualify as exigent
events.79 According to Sotomayor: “The context of blood testing is different in
critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are
truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation . . . because BAC evidence from a
drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively
predictable manner.”80
However, Sotomayor allowed that under certain
circumstances, a particular case might trigger an exigent circumstances exception.81
What proved most striking about Sotomayor’s opinion was a second justification
she offered for requiring warrants in routing stops, namely that “because a police
officer must typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and
obtain the assistance of someone with appropriate medical training before
conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and
the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to

71. Id. at 1556–57.
72. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (discussing the circumstances
of the case and concluding that such circumstances justified the officer’s choice to secure the
evidence absent a warrant).
73. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557.
74. Id. (discussing the trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court’s findings).
75. Id. at 1556.
76. See id. at 1563 (noting that the basis for the finding in Schmerber, the dissipation of
alcohol in the blood, may support a finding of exigency in some cases, but it is not a categorical
exception).
77. Id. at 1561, 1563.
78. Id. at 1563.
79. See id. at 1568 (describing the relevant factors for a “routine DWI” to qualify as an
exigent event).
80. Id. at 1561.
81. See id. at 1568 (finding that some cases will still arise where a warrantless blood test will
be justified).
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obtain a warrant.”82 Yet in some states, where law enforcement officers are trained
to draw blood in the field, such transportation no longer proves necessary.83
B. Blood Draws Under State Laws
New York enacted an “implied consent” statute in 1953, which deemed that
the act of driving itself indicated that a driver had consented to chemical testing for
intoxication.84 All forty-nine other states and the District of Columbia have since
adopted similar statutes.85 However, in some jurisdictions, authorities will attempt
to obtain a suspect’s blood by force, while in others, the driver will simply face a
penalty for refusal, such as automatic forfeiture of a driver’s license and/or a stiff
fine.86 States also differ on whether a bench warrant is required—although states
that now permit warrantless draws will presumably narrow or eliminate such
exception in light of McNeely87—and upon whether the blood may be drawn by the
police themselves or whether medical personnel must conduct the extraction.88 In
1995, Arizona became the first state to authorize law enforcement officers to draw
blood on their own.89 The Phoenix Police Department now has one hundred twenty
officers trained in the practice and conducts up to five hundred tests per month.90
Some police departments in Idaho,91 Texas92 and Utah93 also have officers who are
authorized to conduct on-site phlebotomy.
Table I below describes the various nuances of state statutes regarding blood
draws for law-enforcement purposes. It is also worth noting that at least two states,

82. Id. at 1561.
83. See The Dangers of Phleboto-Cops: Why We All Should Be Frightened About Police
“Phlebotomists”, KATHLEEN N. CAREY LAW OFFICES, PLC, http://www.azduiatty.com/thedangers-of-phleboto-cops.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (discussing the increase in officers
taking blood samples from DUI suspects in the field).
84. NY VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (1953).
85. See Hallinan, supra note 8.
86. See AMY BERNING ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., RES. NOTE NO.
810871, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: BREATH TEST REFUSALS 1, 6 (2007), available at
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/30000/30100/30142/810871.pdf.
87. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.
88. See Correll, supra note 22, at 401–02 (noting that, while New York requires an arresting
officer to obtain a bench warrant or court order, California only allows certified technicians to
conduct blood draws under specific circumstances).
89. See Officers’ New Tool Against D.W.I.: Syringe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at A11.
90. Id. (discussing the use of blood draws by the Phoenix Police Department as well as other
police departments around the country).
91. Rebecca Boone, DWI Project Drawing Blood, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Sept. 14 2009,
at 8A.
92. See id. (noting that a select group of Texas officers have received training to complete
blood draws on suspected drunken drivers).
93. See BERNING ET AL., supra note 86, at 6 (noting that as of 2006, there were fifty-three
police officers in Utah trained to perform blood draws and that the state planned to train more).
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Hawaii94 and Idaho,95 have statutes that overtly compel health care providers to
perform blood draws when instructed to do so by law enforcement. In contrast,
South Dakota law explicitly guarantees medical providers the right to refuse such a
request.96 The impact of McNeely is unclear, as states may either impose a warrant
requirement university or might choose to delineate narrower, exigent
circumstances under which a warrant would not be required.97
TABLE 1: STATE LAWS REGARDING BLOOD DRAWS
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
State
AL98

Authorizes
Force
NO

Warrant
Required?
NO (for
unconscious
drivers)

Who May
Perform
No restrictions (for
unconscious
drivers)

AK99

YES

NO

No restrictions

AR100

NO

Not
applicable

Not applicable

Additional
Restrictions
Consent to draw
blood on
unconscious
driver is presumed
Only applies
when a preceding
motor vehicle
incident has
resulted in
“physical injury to
another person.”
Not applicable

94. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291E (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).
95. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8002–03 (2004 & Supp. 2012); see also Idaho v. Diaz, 160 P.3d
739, 743 (Idaho 2007) (“A plain reading of Idaho Code § 18-8002(6) shows that an officer may
always request hospital personnel to draw a suspect’s blood upon suspicion for DUI but may only
compel a blood draw under certain circumstances.”).
96. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-14 (2011).
97. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) (discussing the relevant factors in
determining whether exigent circumstances existed, justifying a warrantless search, but clarifying
that a broad interpretation to include all DWI cases is insufficient for a warrantless seizure of
blood evidence).
98. ALA. CODE §§ 32-5-192, 32-5A-194(a)(2), 32-5-200 (LexisNexis 2010).
99. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.035 (2010). But see Bass v. Mun. of Anchorage, 692 P.2d. 961,
965 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the section should be read narrowly because the
legislature did not want to give police the power to forcibly take blood tests).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1321(D) (Supp. 2011) (noting that a test shall not be given if
refused unless pursuant to a search warrant); see also Carrillo v. Houser, 232 P.3d 1245, 1245
(Ariz. 2010) (holding that Arizona’s implied consent statute typically forbids police from giving a
test in the absence of a warrant unless the arrestee agrees to it); U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION,
REFUSAL OF INTOXICATION TESTING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2008) available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%20Injury%20Control/Articles/Associated%20Files/8
11098.pdf.
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AZ101

YES

YES

Medical personnel
only, unless driver
consent
No Restrictions

CA102

YES

NO

CO103

YES

NO

Medical personnel
only

CT104

UNCLEAR

NO

Medical personnel
only

DE105

YES

NO

FL106

YES

NO

Medical personnel
only
No restrictions

[VOL. 17:

Unless officer
suspects other
intoxicants, driver
may consent to
breath test instead
Limited to cases
of negligent
vehicular
homicide
Section 227b of
statute requires
driver consent;
however, section
227c seems to
permit draws in
absence of
consent for
probable causes if
serious injury or
death has
occurred. Author
could find no
causes in which
force was actually
use

Only applies
when a preceding
motor vehicle
incident has
resulted in

101. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-205(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
102. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23612 (West Supp. 2012).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301.1(3) (West 2012) (noting that physical force is allowed
only when a law enforcement officer “has probable cause to believe that the person has committed
criminally negligent homicide”).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227b, 227c (West Supp. 2012).
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2740, 2741, 2746 (2005).
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“serious bodily
injury.”
GA107

NO

Not applicable

YES

Not
applicable
NO

HI108

ID109

YES

NO

IL110

YES

NO

Medical personnel
or officers with
specialized
training.
Medical personnel
only

IN111

YES

NO

IA112

YES

YES

KS113

YES

YES

Medical personnel
only

Medical personnel
only
Medical personnel
only

No restrictions

Possible breath
test option in
cases where no
injury occurs

Only applies in
cases of death or
injury

Only applies in
cases of death or
injury likely to
cause death
Applies when
driver “was
operating or
attempting to
operate a vehicle
and such vehicle
has been involved
in an accident or
collision resulting
in serious injury
or death of a

106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1933 (West 2006).
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-67.1(d) (2011).
108. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 291E-12, 21 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).
109. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8002, -8003 (Supp. 2012); see also State v. Diaz, 160 P.3d 739,
741 (Idaho 2007) (discussing the Idaho Code and how implied consent allows for “testing a
suspect’s blood”).
110. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-501.2 (West 2008); See also Yanchin v. Libertyville, 803
F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
111. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-6-6 (LexisNexis 2010).
112. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321J.10A–11 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
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KY114

YES

YES

Medical personnel
only

LA115

YES

NO

No restrictions

ME116

YES

NO

Driver may request
medical personnel,
if available

MD

YES

NO

Medical personnel
only

NO

Not applicable

117

MA
MI119

YES

Not
applicable
YES

MN

YES

NO

118

120

Medical personnel
only
Medical personnel
only

[VOL. 17:
person and the
operator could be
cited for any
traffic offense
Applies when a
person is killed or
suffers serious
injury
Two prior
incidents of
refusal required
Only applies if
officer believes
“death has
occurred or will
occur as a result
of an accident.”
Only applies in
cases of death or
life threatening
injury

Only applies in
cases of death,
injury, or property
damage

113. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (2001).
114. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.105(2)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:98.2 (2012); see also State v. Dayton, 445 So.2d 76 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (including “chemical blood analysis” in a discussion of “chemical tests,” which is the
term used in the relevant statute).
116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 2521, 2522, 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2011).
117. MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 2012).
119. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625a(6)(b), .625d (West Supp. 2012); see also AMY
BERNING ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT HS 811098,
REFUSAL OF INTOXICATION TESTING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2008) (noting that in most
Michigan counties prosecutors have adopted policies requiring police officers to receive warrants
before submitting drivers to a blood test).
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MS121

NO

MO

YES

122

Not
applicable
YES—but
struck down
in Missouri v.
McNeely
(2013)123
YES

Not applicable

Not applicable

Medical personnel
only

MT124

YES

NE125

NO

NV126

YES

Not
applicable
NO

NH127

YES

NO

143

Medical personnel
only

No restrictions

No restrictions

Only in cases with
prior conviction
for DWI related
offense

Only applies if the
officer has
“reasonable
grounds to
believe” that the
driver caused
death or serious
harm to another
while driving
drunk or has been
convicted within
the previous seven
years of a similar
violation
Only applies in
cases of death or

120. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.51 (West Supp. 2012); see also Minnesota v. Shriner, 751
N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 2008); supra note 15 and accompanying text.
121. MISS. CODE ANN § 63-11-30 (2004 & Supp. 2011).
122. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 577.029, .041 (West 2011); see also State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that law enforcement officers can proceed with a blood draw after a
defendant has refused as long as officers obtain a warrant).
123. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) (holding that the natural dissipation
of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case involving a drunkdriving investigation).
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (2011).
125. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-6, 197, 197.03 (Supp. 2011).
126. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.160 (2010); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note 119, at
15 (noting that Nevada’s law does not require police officers to obtain a warrant before
conducting forcible blood draws on drivers who refuse to take a breath test).
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NJ128

UNCLEAR

NO

Medical personnel
only

NM

YES

YES

NY130

YES

YES

Medical personnel
only
No restrictions

NC131

YES

NO

ND132

NO

OH133

YES

Not
applicable
NO

129

[VOL. 17:
serious injury
Despite seemingly
clear state statute
prohibiting
involuntary blood
draws, some state
courts have
upheld such draws
on implied
consent grounds

Only applies in
cases of death or
serious injury

“[A] physician,
registered nurse,
emergency medical
technician, or other
qualified person.”
NA
“Only a physician,
a registered nurse,
an emergency
medical technicianintermediate, an
emergency medical
technicianparamedic, or a

127. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:5, A:16 (LexisNexis 2011).
128. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2(e) (West Supp. 2012) (stating the forcible taking of chemical
tests is not permitted); see also State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301, 305 (N.J. 2001) (ruling that
implied consent exists “when the test is itself [is] not performed forcibly or against physical
resistance”).
129. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-103, 111 (LexisNexis 2009).
130. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 2011).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-16.2, -139.1 (2011); see also State v. Fletcher, 688 S.E.2d
94, 98 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that North Carolina law allows police officers to obtain forced
blood tests without a search warrant as long as an officer has “probable cause” and a “reasonable
belief that a delay in testing would result in dissipation of the person’s blood alcohol content”).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 2011).
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
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OK134

NO

OR135

YES

PA136

NO

RI 137

NO

SC138

NO

SD139

NO

Not
applicable
Varies by
county
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
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qualified
technician,
chemist, or
phlebotomist shall
withdraw a blood
sample for the
purpose of
determining the
alcohol, drug,
controlled
substance,
metabolite of a
controlled
substance, or
combination
content of the
whole blood, blood
serum, or blood
plasma.”
Not applicable
Medical personnel
only
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable

Also creates
complete shield
for physicians:
“No person

134. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-902 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
135. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.100, .160(2) (2011); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note 119, at
14 (“The use of warrants for blood samples in Oregon began more recently and is in effect in a
few counties. There is not a specific law that allows for forced blood draws, but Oregon’s
impaired driving law has been interpreted to allow for warrants and blood draws. The officer must
first inform the suspect of the consequences of refusing or failing the test.”).
136. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b) (West Supp. 2012).
137. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(b) (Supp. 2011).
138. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6-2951(A) (Supp. 2011).
139. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-14 (2011).
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TN140

YES

NO

Medical personnel
only

TX141

YES

NO

No restrictions

UT142

YES

NO

No restrictions

[VOL. 17:
authorized to
withdraw blood
under this section
may be required
or forced to
withdraw blood
for the purposes
outlined in this
chapter, unless
required pursuant
to a written
agreement.”
Only applies if
accident causes
serious injury or
death, if driver
has two prior
convictions, or if
children are in
vehicle
“[A]llows for
blood draws to be
conducted when a
preceding motor
vehicle incident
has resulted in
death or serious
injury or has been
convicted of
certain crimes in
the past.”

140. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
141. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2010); see also Beeman v.
State, 86 S.W.3d. 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that “the implied consent statute
requires the State to take an arrested suspect’s blood, over his refusal, when there is an accident
and someone is injured”).
142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-520 (LexisNexis 2010); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note
119, at 14 (noting that since 2006 Utah has required police officers to obtain warrants for blood
draws for breath test refusals and that the state’s procedure is based not on a statute but on “case
law whereby a police officer swears an affidavit before a justice and can be granted a warrant to
obtain a blood sample”).
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VT143

YES

YES

Medical personnel
only

VA144
WA

YES
YES

NO
YES

No restrictions
No restrictions

NO

Not
applicable
NO

Not applicable

147

Only in cases of
serious injury or
death

145

WV
146

WI147

YES

WY

YES

148

YES (unless
serious death
or injury
occur)

doctor, nurse,
medical
technologist,
physician assistant
or person acting
under the direction
of a physician
Trained officers or
medical personnel

Warrantless draws
permitted in cases
of serious death or
injury

While state laws differ considerably, the overall trend in recent years has been
toward the expansion of forcible testing.149 “No refusal” weekends have become
frequent occurrences in Texas, where 212 communities—including Houston,
Austin and Fort Worth—participate.150 These blanket compulsory testing periods
143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202(f), 1203(b) (2007 & Supp. 2011).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (2009).
145. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308(3) (West 2013); see also Seattle v. St. John 215
P.3d 194, 197 (Wash. 2009) (discussing how, despite Washington’s implied consent statute, an
officer may obtain a blood alcohol test if they obtain a warrant).
146. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5-7 (LexisNexis 2009).
147. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West 2010); see also State v. Krajewski, 648 N.W.2d 385,
398–99 (Wis. 2002) (reasoning that the “rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates an
exigency that justifies a nonconsensual test of the blood” for persons arrested for drunk driving as
long as the test is administered pursuant to certain factors).
148. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-6-102(d), -105(b) (2011).
149. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (noting that at least eight states have enacted statutes
permitting police officers to use reasonable force to obtain blood samples from drivers in DUI
cases).
150See Allison Harris, Austin Police, Various Agencies to Enforce No-Refusal Weekend, DAILY
TEXAN (July 4, 2011), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2011/07/04/austin-police-variousagencies-enforce-no-refusal-weekend (discussing the number of law enforcement agencies in
Texas that have adopted a “no refusal” weekend policy to reduce drinking and driving); Stephanie
Lucero, North Texas No Refusal Weekend Starts Friday Night, CBS (Dec. 28, 2012),
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have spread to localities in at least seven other states,151 among which are the cities
of Columbus, Ohio,152 and Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.153 Eight states have
adopted or expanded forcible blood draws in the last ten years, while other states,
such as Colorado, have seriously considered legislation.154 Increasingly, these laws
create ethical and legal challenges for hospitals and clinicians.155 Not the least of
these dilemmas is the difficulty of determining the accurate rule in a particular
jurisdiction, as police departments and prosecutors have often engaged in
aggressive interpretations of state laws to conduct nonconsensual tests in states,
such as Illinois, where a plain reading of the statute would have led a reasonable
person to conclude that such tests were prohibited.156 While the state policies
outlined above offer a considered assessment of current law, the complexity of the
statutes and potential for aggressive interpretation raise the possibility that
physicians in nearly any jurisdiction might be asked to conduct forcible
phlebotomy.

http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/12/28/north-texas-no-refusal-weekend-starts-friday-night/ (reporting
deputies will patrol for suspected drunk driving during the New Years holiday); Brian Rogers,
Prosecutors Tout Success of No-Refusal Weekend, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Prosecutors-tout-success-of-no-refusalweekend-2439541.php (reporting the No Refusal program had been in effect in Harris County and
Montgomery County nearly every weekend in 2011).
151. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., No-Refusal Initiative Facts,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/no-refusal/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (reporting that numerous states
including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Texas, and Utah have
implemented No Refusal initiatives).
152. See Kathy L. Gray, Holiday DUI Suspects Risk Forced Blood Test; Court’s OK Likely if
Breath Exam Is Refused, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 2008, at 3B (discussing how Columbus
police instituted a “no-refusal weekend” during which drivers refusing to take breath tests were
compelled to take blood tests).
153. See Melinda Morris, DWI Suspects Will Face Forced Blood Tests Judges Will be Ready
on Holiday Weekend, NEWSROOM, May 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 9860143 (discussing
how the Jefferson Parish district attorney’s office arranged for judges to be available over
Memorial Day weekend to sign search warrants giving officers the authority to conduct blood
tests on DWI suspects).
154. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (reporting that Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, Florida, Indiana,
Michigan, Nevada, and Texas all recently passed statutes permitting police to use reasonable force
to obtain blood samples); see also Rebecca Boyle, Under Bill, Drunk Drivers Would Have to Take
Alcohol
Test,
GREELEY
TRIB.
(Mar.
22,
2007),
http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20070322/NEWS/103210101 (reporting a proposed bill in
Colorado where suspected drunk drivers, who are given the option of a breathalyzer or blood test,
will be required to take a test even if the requested option is not available).
155. See, e.g., E. John Wherry, Jr., DWI Blood Alcohol Testing: Responding to a Proposal
Compelling Medical Personnel to Withdraw Blood, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 655, 657, 670–71
(1994) (commenting that laws requiring medical personnel to draw blood for law enforcement
purposes violate physician-patient privilege as well as a health provider’s ethical duty to care for
the health of patients).
156. See People v. Farris, 968 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting Illinois’s
statute to prohibit law enforcement officials from using force to obtain a blood sample of a DWI
suspect).
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II. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The dominant approach to western medical ethics since the 1970s is one that
favors patient autonomy and privileges the right of the competent patient to make
his own medical decisions.157 Among the most fundamental aspects of this right is
the authority to turn down unwanted medical interventions.158 Western medical
ethicists and courts have largely reached a consensus that an adult with capacity
may reject even life saving measures—guaranteeing, for example, Jehovah’s
Witnesses the right to refuse blood transfusions and Christian Scientists the right to
refuse antibiotics.159 Physicians who forcibly provide such care over a patient’s
objections will risk civil liability and may be guilty of battery.160 At the same time,
government and professional authorities have long accepted that medical providers,
as licensees of the state and possessors of a state-sanctioned monopoly in the
healing arts, have dual loyalties: in addition to having an ethical duty to individual
patients, providers also have an ethical obligation to serve the public at large that
may trump the duty to patients under limited circumstances.161 As a result,
physicians may be compelled to report a wide variety of public health hazards,
ranging from communicable diseases to gunshot wounds.162 Physicians may also
be compelled to violate doctor-patient confidentiality in instances of suspected

157. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward
a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 391–97 (1990) (describing the
evolution of the patient’s right to informed consent and to self-determination).
158. See, e.g., George J. Annas & Joan E. Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical
Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 565–69 (1984) (describing the
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment).
159. See generally Sarah Woolley, Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Emergency Department: What
Are Their Rights?, 22 EMERGENCY MED. J. 869, 870 (2005) (explaining that the law
unequivocally protects the Jehovah’s Witness patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, even
when physicians believe the reasons are irrational and the patient will die in the absence of
treatment); Larry May, Challenging Medical Authority: The Refusal of Treatment by Christian
Scientists, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 15, 15–17 (explaining that Christian
Scientists refuse all medical treatment and turn to prayer to battle health issues).
160. See, e.g., Malette v. Shulman, [1990] O.R. 2d. 417 (Can. Ont.) (holding a physician liable
for negligence, assault, and battery for performing a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness
patient who carried a card in her wallet identifying her as a Jehovah’s Witness and requesting that
no blood transfusion be given to her); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93–
94 (N.Y. 1914) (noting that a surgeon who operates on a patient without the patient’s consent
commits an assault).
161. See Christopher J. Lockey & Phillip Resnick, Physicians’ Duty to Prevent Harm to
Nonpatients, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 580, 581 (2008).
162. See Jeffrey T. Berger et al., Reporting by Physicians of Impaired Drivers and Potentially
Impaired Drivers, 15 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 667, 669 (2000) (explaining that compulsory
reporting of conditions that impact public safety is an exception to patient-physician
confidentiality); see generally MD. CODE REGS. 10.06.01.03 (2011) (requiring health care
providers to report certain diseases and conditions); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-703
(LexisNexis 2009) (requiring health care practitioners to report gunshot injuries).
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child abuse, future violent crimes or the impaired practice of medicine.163 In fact,
some jurisdictions even require physicians to report impaired driving to state
authorities.164 Forcible blood draws of suspected drunk drivers place the duty to
patient autonomy and the duty to protect the public in direct conflict.165
Blood draws are not entirely benign interventions.166 While for the vast
majority of suspects, the only side effect of the procedure is minor pain and
bruising, a small subset of individuals may suffer more significant detriment.167
Some individuals have compelling medical reasons for refusing blood draws, such
as hemophilia or ongoing anticoagulant therapy.168 Others may have religious
objections to removing blood, especially when the blood draw is not intended to
serve a life-saving or other medical purpose169 Some state statutes do shield these
minorities, but providers and law enforcement will likely face considerable

163. See Frank T. Saulsbury & Robert E. Campbell, Evaluation of Child Abuse Reporting by
Physicians, 139 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 393, 394 (1985) (reporting that in one study
surveying physicians the majority of physicians claimed to report almost all sexual abuse cases to
authorities); see also COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CEJA REP.
A-I-91, REPORTING IMPAIRED, INCOMPETENT OR UNETHICAL COLLEAGUES 1, 2 (1992) (noting
that for centuries medical ethical standards have required physicians to report inappropriate
conduct by colleagues); Elisia Klinka, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the Tarasoff
Duty and its Legal Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 863, 883 (2009) (establishing that most states have enacted laws requiring
psychotherapists to report confidential patient communication if it would prevent harm to possible
victims of the patient).
164. See Berger et al., supra note 162, at 669 (noting that a few states have enacted laws
requiring physicians to disclose whether patients have certain health conditions such as epilepsy or
dementia that could impair driving abilities).
165. See Robert R. Wilk, Compelling Medical Personnel to Draw Blood Samples From DWI
Suspects, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 329, 355 (1993) (commenting that forcible blood draws for
DWI cases evoke concerns of violating patient rights and arguing that the need to protect potential
victims of a drunk driver overrides this concern).
166. See, e.g., State v. McNabb, No. 36552, slip op. at 2 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2010)
(describing how officers restrained the defendant by holding him down on the hospital floor while
medical personnel drew his blood after he refused to submit to a sobriety test).
167. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GUIDELINES ON DRAWING BLOOD: BEST PRACTICES IN
PHLEBOTOMY 3–4 (2010) (noting that the risks of blood draws include loss of consciousness,
seizures, anxiety, fainting, and exposure to bloodborne pathogens including hepatitis).
168. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (noting that blood draws can be dangerous for people with
certain medical conditions including hemophilia); What is Hemophilia?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, &
BLOOD INST. (July 1, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/hemophilia/
(explaining that hemophilia is an inherited disease that can cause uncontrollable, life-threatening
bleeding); Amir K. Jaffer et al., When Patients On Warfarin Need Surgery, 70 CLEV. CLINIC J.
MED. 973, 973 (2003) (explaining that patients on Warfarin, a popular anticoagulation therapy
drug that thins the blood to prevent blood clots, have a high risk of bleeding).
169. See Leah Perry, Religious Beliefs & Phlebotomy, OPPOSING VIEWS,
http://people.opposingviews.com/religious-beliefs-phlebotomy-4582.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2013) (discussing the strong objections to phlebotomy, even in life-saving circumstances, that
certain religious groups hold).
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challenges in determining who qualifies.170 Once these exemptions become well
known, many DWI suspect will likely claim religious or medical exemptions—at
least until the alcohol dissipates from their bloodstreams. Another subset of
individuals suffers from a deep fear of needles, trypanophobia, and may find the
intervention psychologically traumatic.171 Hamilton reports that up to ten percent
of Americans may suffer some degree of this disorder, and even reports cases of
fatal reactions secondary to a vaso-vagal reflex after injection.172 Moreover, all
blood draws pose at least some additional risk of infection.173 In a well publicized
2007 case, thirty-one-year-old test pilot James Green of Arizona sued Pima County
and its Sheriff’s Department after a forced blood draw allegedly left him with an
infection for months that did not respond to antibiotics.174 Yet the very risks
involved in forced blood draws might arguably justify physician involvement.
Since some states now allow police to draw blood without medical personnel,175
which might result in even greater risk,176 providers who refuse to participate—at
least in those jurisdictions—do not ultimately change the outcome for suspects and
may actually expose them to increased dangers. Of course, such reasoning might
be used to justify physician involvement in a broad swath of questionably ethical
police activity, including enhanced interrogation methods.177
Suspects transported to hospitals solely for the purposes of forced blood
draws may not be patients in the traditional sense; and some advocates of forced
blood draws might argue that they are not patients at all.178 Yet professional
170. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.160 (LexisNexis 2012) (exempting hemophiliacs
and drivers with heart conditions requiring the use of anticoagulants from forcible blood draws,
but also providing that such drivers must take a breath or urine test).
171. See James G. Hamilton, Needle Phobia: A Neglected Diagnosis, 41 J. FAM. PRAC. 169,
169 (1995) (noting the various health symptoms that individuals with needle phobia experience
when exposed to needles).
172. Id.
173. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 168, at 3 (suggesting that blood draws have the
potential to expose individuals to infection and other possible injuries).
174. Erica Meltzer, Blood Draws by Officers in DUI Stops Questioned, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
Oct. 14, 2007, at A1.
175. See Hallinan, supra note 8.
176. See Wherry, supra note 155, at 667–68 (noting that blood-borne pathogens such as the
HIV virus can be transmitted during the blood drawing process); WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra
note 168, at 3 (explaining best phlebotomy practices to lower the risks of blood draws, including
infection and loss of consciousness); Meltzer, supra note 175 (reporting that a blood draw
performed in a squad car by an officer took two tries and resulted in swelling and a persistent
infection).
177. See Steven P. Cohen, Letter to the Editor, Doctors and Interrogation, 353 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1633–34 (2005) (citing humanitarian reasons as possible justification for participation in
interrogation).
178. Compare Wilk, supra note 165, at 330–33 (stating that, although most members of the
medical community “overextend themselves to assist police officers,” some medical personnel
“openly seek to thwart” officers’ efforts to obtain a blood sample without patient consent), with
State v. Johnston, 305 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (describing DWI suspects as
“patients,” language which could be interpreted as reflecting the testifying expert, a physician, and
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organizations of health care providers have none-the-less consistently found that
the absence of a traditional provider-patient relationship does not free a provider to
become an agent of law enforcement without limitation. For example, the
American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association have
determined that participation in executions violates the ethical duties of
physicians.179 A consensus is slowly emerging that the forcible medication of
psychiatric patients to render them fit for capital punishments, while legal, is also
impermissible.180 Although the stakes are clearly lower in forced blood draw cases
than in capital trials, society also has many other options available to reduce
intoxicated driving that do not entail commandeering health professionals. These
range from increasing the penalties for refusing to consent181 to requiring breath
alcohol ignition locks in vehicles.182 Relying upon health workers may be easier
and cheaper, as compared with training a separate body of professionals to engage
in such blood draws, but that alone is not a satisfactory justification.183
Unfortunately, the leading professional organizations have as yet not taken a firm
stance on the practice or outlined guidelines for participation by their members.184
Needless to say, such guidance is long overdue.
Since the individual provider in the field will likely have little power to resist
police demands for forced testing—and may even be uncertain as to the governing
law—hospitals should clarify their positions on the practice in advance and should
the court’s reluctance to affirmatively label a DWI suspect brought in to the hospital for a blood
draw as a patient).
179. AM. MED. ASS’N., AMA POLICY E-2.06, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (1994) (barring
physician participation in an execution because such participation would directly conflict with a
physician’s duty to preserve life when possible); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2005).
180. See Ebrahim J. Kermani et al., Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: The Landmark Supreme
Court Cases and Their Ethical Implications for the Profession, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 95, 97–98 (1994) (analyzing the ethical dilemmas that result from psychiatrists medicating
patients to make them competent for execution as it directly violates their professional obligation
of beneficence and nonmaleficence toward patients).
181. See, e.g., Michelle Dynes, Refusing Sobriety Test May Become a Crime, WYO. TRIB.EAGLE, Jan. 5, 2011, at A2 (reporting that the Wyoming legislature considered making a DWI’s
suspect’s refusal of a breathalyzer tests a misdemeanor punishable by a $750 fine).
182. See generally KAREN SPRATTLER, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PUB. NO.
DOT HS 811246, IGNITION INTERLOCKS – WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: A TOOLKIT FOR
POLICYMAKERS, HIGHWAY SAFETY PROFESSIONALS, AND ADVOCATES 5–6 (2009); see also
DUI/DWI
Laws,
INSURANCE
INST.
FOR
HIGHWAY
SAFETY
(Apr.
2013),
http://www.iihs.org/laws/dui.aspx (listing state laws regarding mandatory ignition interlocks for
repeat offenses).
183. See, e.g., 2013 Phlebotomy Technician Program, ARIZ. MED. TRAINING INST. (2013),
http://arizonamedicaltraininginstitute.com/programs/phlebotomy/ (providing a course description
available in Arizona for phlebotomy training, including required hours spent in training and
associated costs with the course).
184. See generally, e.g. AM. PHLEBOTOMY ASS’N (Sep. 17, 2013), http://www.apa2.com/
(containing a great deal of information regarding this professional organization related to
phlebotomy, but providing no guidance with regards to the field officer participation).
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notify all emergency providers. Hospitals may even be able to negotiate with local
authorities to establish guidelines for participation that meet the needs of law
enforcement without damaging the perceived ethical duties of clinicians. Earlier
this year, for example, Memorial Hospital of Converse County, Wyoming, did
precisely that: after initially refusing involvement with any forcible blood draws,
citing ethical and liability concerns, the hospital worked out an arrangement with
local police to conduct the involuntary tests off-site, under color of a judicial
warrant, an approach that apparently satisfied their providers’ objections.185
While individual providers will likely differ regarding whether and when
participation in forcible blood draws is ethical, in the absence of clear guidance
from professional organizations, three minimum standards seem necessary to
justify any healthcare institution participating in such procedures. First, forced
blood draws should be completely sequestered from the practice of medical care.
The medical providers designated to take part in the forced blood draw should play
no other role in the care of the suspect, as the risk is too great that the blurring of
roles will compromise the greater medical care of the patient.186 So, for example, if
a patient is injured in a motor vehicle accident, the physicians and nurses attending
to his injuries must not be the same individuals who draw blood for police. Should
care givers need to draw blood for therapeutic reasons, this blood ought not also be
used for law enforcement purposes—and the patient should be advised which
interventions are being conducted on his behalf and which are being conducted to
serve the interests of the public. Second, institutions should require assurances that
involuntary blood samples are used solely for the determination of intoxication.
While the police may have a legitimate reason for using blood samples for other
law enforcement purposes—such as storing them for future DNA checks against
crime scenes187—physicians ought not risk being complicit in such projects,
particularly as these extraneous uses raise significant risks to a subject’s privacy.188
Ideally, a sensible policy will require that all blood samples either be returned to
the hospital after testing is completed, or that the hospital be provided with written
confirmation of their destruction. Finally, individual providers should be
guaranteed the right to opt out of the intervention as long as they make a good faith
effort to find another provider who can participate. Such conscience clauses have

185. See Collin McRann, MHCC Reverses Its Policy on Involuntary DUI Blood Draws,
DOUGLAS
BUDGET
(Wyoming)
(Sept.
28,
2011),
www.douglasbudget.com/news/article_51f67596-e9ee-11e0-b3fb-0001cc4c03286.html.
186. See Wherry, supra note 155, at 667–80 (highlighting the ethical and legal dilemmas
physicians face in conducting forcible blood draws on patients).
187. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded “Future
Diaries”, 270 JAMA 2346, 2347 (1993) (noting that law enforcement officials want to create
DNA fingerprinting banks to identify perpetrators).
188. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491 (Cal. 1990)
(examining the argument that depriving a patient of the power to control what happens to their
tissues would be an invasion of the patient’s privacy and dignity).
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for many years shielded physicians from participation in certain reproductive and
end-of-life interventions they find objectionable189—even in circumstances where
the result is that a patient’s medical needs go unmet.190 It would prove ironic if
physicians could not opt out of interventions that have the potential to harm the
patient on similar grounds of conscience. Occasionally, such conscience objections
may prevent any blood draw from taking place—if, for instance, no willing
provider can be found—but, in the absence of any evidence that such occurrences
will be widespread, the risk of a few missed blood draws seems less grave than the
damage to be done by forcing reluctant providers to draw blood from patients under
the threat of criminal sanction.191
While using the public roads may entail consent to forcible blood testing,192
joining the health care professions does not necessarily entail consent to perform
such blood draws.193 The act of inflicting unwanted medical care on a competent
adult—a violent intrusion that contrasts strikingly with the general norms of the
healing trades—is likely to prove disturbing and objectionable to many
professional caregivers.194 At a minimum, providers and their employers should
educate themselves on their specific duties and should reach out to local law
enforcement authorities to clarify in advance potential matters of disagreement.
Advance planning may not entirely eliminate the possibility of conflict, but such a
negotiated approach has at least the potential to mitigate friction between providers
and public authorities. After all, the ethical and legal issues surrounding forcible
blood draws by physicians and hospital employees are far too important to be
resolved ad hoc in emergency rooms as difficult cases arise.

189. JODY FEDER, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RS21428, THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF
ABORTION CONSCIENCE LAWS 1, 1 (2005) (discussing the conscience clause laws and how they
are sued to resolve the problem with physicians providing care that they believe is against their
religious beliefs).
190. Cf. Rachel Benson Gold, Conscience Makes a Comeback In the Age of Managed Care,
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 1998, at 1, 1 (arguing the conscience clauses effectively
allow entities to opt out of paying for any health care service by claiming “conscience”).
191. See Wherry, supra note 155, at 677–80 (arguing that there would be immense harm to the
medical profession if physicians were compelled to violate fundamental ethical principles of their
profession).
192. See Robert B. Voas et al., Implied-Consent Laws: A Review of the Literature and
Examination of Current Problems and Related Statutes, 40 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 79 (2009) (noting
that states have passed implied-consent laws providing that drivers in becoming licensed have
implicitly given consent to chemical tests by law enforcement).
193. See Wherry, supra note 155, at 677–78 (arguing that physicians are ethically prohibited
from forcibly drawing blood on patients).
194. See id.

